Foundations of Computer Security Lecture 60: The Needham-Schroeder Protocol


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Many existing protocols are derived from one proposed by Needham and Schroeder (1978), including the widely used Kerberos authentication protocol suite.

N-S is a *shared-key authentication protocol* designed to generate and propagate a *session key*, i.e., a shared key for subsequent symmetrically encrypted communication.

Note that there is no public key infrastructure in place.

There are three principals: A and B, two principals desiring mutual communication, and S, a trusted key server.



It is assumed that A and B already have secure symmetric communication with S using keys  $K_{as}$  and  $K_{bs}$ , respectively.

N-S uses *nonces* (short for "numbers used once"), randomly generated values included in messages.

If a nonce is generated and sent by A in one step and returned by B in a later step, A knows that B's message is *fresh* and not a replay from an earlier exchange.

Note that a nonce *is not a timestamp*. The only assumption is that it has not been used in any earlier interchange, with high probability.

Two questions to ask of any step in any protocol:

- What is the sender trying to say with this message?
- What is the receiver entitled to believe after receiving the message?

The Needham-Schroeder protocol is:

$$A \rightarrow S : A, B, N_{a}$$

$$S \rightarrow A : \{N_{a}, B, K_{ab}, \{K_{ab}, A\}_{K_{bs}}\}_{K_{as}}$$

$$A \rightarrow B : \{K_{ab}, A\}_{K_{bs}}$$

$$B \rightarrow A : \{N_{b}\}_{K_{ab}}$$

$$A \rightarrow B : \{N_{b}-1\}_{K_{ab}}$$

Here  $N_a$  and  $N_b$  are nonces.

- Needham-Schroeder is a shared-key authentication protocol that has been very important historically.
- It illustrates:
  - the overall structure of protocols;
  - that some principals may have special roles to play;
  - the usefulness of nonces.

Next lecture: Attacks on Needham-Schroeder