



EUROPEAN STANDARD

CYBER;
Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things:
Baseline Requirements

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Foreword

This final draft European Standard (EN) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Cyber Security (CYBER), and is now submitted for the Vote phase of the ETSI standards EN Approval Procedure.

Proposed national transposition dates	
Date of latest announcement of this EN (doa):	3 months after ETSI publication
Date of latest publication of new National Standard or endorsement of this EN (dop/e):	6 months after doa
Date of withdrawal of any conflicting National Standard (dow):	6 months after doa

Modal verbs terminology

In the present document "**shall**", "**shall not**", "**should**", "**should not**", "**may**", "**need not**", "**will**", "**will not**", "**can**" and "**cannot**" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the [ETSI Drafting Rules](#) (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions).

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Introduction

As more devices in the home connect to the Internet, the cyber security of the Internet of Things (IoT) becomes a growing concern. People entrust their personal data to an increasing number of online devices and services. Products and appliances that have traditionally been offline are now connected and need to be designed to withstand cyber threats.

The present document brings together widely considered good practice in security for Internet-connected consumer devices in a set of high-level outcome-focused provisions. The objective of the present document is to support all parties involved in the development and manufacturing of consumer IoT with guidance on securing their products.

The provisions are primarily outcome-focused, rather than prescriptive, giving organizations the flexibility to innovate and implement security solutions appropriate for their products.

The present document is not intended to solve all security challenges associated with consumer IoT. It also does not focus on protecting against attacks that are prolonged/sophisticated or that require sustained physical access to the device. Rather, the focus is on the technical controls and organizational policies that matter most in addressing the most significant and widespread security shortcomings. Overall, a baseline level of security is considered; this is intended to protect against elementary attacks on fundamental design weaknesses (such as the use of easily guessable passwords).

The present document provides a set of baseline provisions applicable to all consumer IoT devices. It is intended to be complemented by other standards defining more specific provisions and fully testable and/or verifiable requirements for specific devices which, together with the present document, will facilitate the development of assurance schemes.

Many consumer IoT devices and their associated services process and store personal data, the present document can help in ensuring that these are compliant with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [i.7]. Security by design is an important principle that is endorsed by the present document.

ETSI TS 103 701 [i.19] provides guidance on how to assess and assure IoT products against provisions within the present document.

The provisions in the present document have been developed following review of published standards, recommendations and guidance on IoT security and privacy, including: ETSI TR 103 305-3 [i.1], ETSI TR 103 309 [i.2], ENISA Baseline Security Recommendations [i.8], UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) Secure by Design Report [i.9], IoT Security Foundation Compliance Framework [i.10], GSMA IoT Security Guidelines and Assessment [i.11], ETSI TR 103 533 [i.12], DIN SPEC 27072 [i.20] and OWASP Internet of Things [i.23].

NOTE: Mappings of the landscape of IoT security standards, recommendations and guidance are available in ENISA Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT - Interactive Tool [i.15] and in Copper Horse Mapping Security & Privacy in the Internet of Things [i.14].

As consumer IoT products become increasingly secure, it is envisioned that future revisions of the present document will mandate provisions that are currently recommendations in the present document.

1 Scope

The present document specifies high-level security and data protection provisions for consumer IoT devices that are connected to network infrastructure (such as the Internet or home network) and their interactions with associated services. The associated services are out of scope. A non-exhaustive list of examples of consumer IoT devices includes:

- connected children's toys and baby monitors;
- connected smoke detectors, door locks and window sensors;
- IoT gateways, base stations and hubs to which multiple devices connect;
- smart cameras, TVs and speakers;
- wearable health trackers;
- connected home automation and alarm systems, especially their gateways and hubs;
- connected appliances, such as washing machines and fridges; and
- smart home assistants.

Moreover, the present document addresses security considerations specific to constrained devices.

EXAMPLE: Window contact sensors, flood sensors and energy switches are typically constrained devices.

The present document provides basic guidance through examples and explanatory text for organizations involved in the development and manufacturing of consumer IoT on how to implement those provisions. Table B.1 provides a schema for the reader to give information about the implementation of the provisions.

Devices that are not consumer IoT devices, for example those that are primarily intended to be used in manufacturing, healthcare or other industrial applications, are not in scope of the present document.

The present document has been developed primarily to help protect consumers, however, other users of consumer IoT equally benefit from the implementation of the provisions set out here.

Annex A (informative) of the present document has been included to provide context to clauses 4, 5 and 6 (normative). Annex A contains examples of device and reference architectures and an example model of device states including data storage for each state.

2 References

2.1 Normative references

References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at <https://docbox.etsi.org/Reference/>.

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The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document.

Not applicable.

2.2 Informative references

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NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.

The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area.

[i.1] ETSI TR 103 305-3: "CYBER; Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defence; Part 3: Service Sector Implementations".

[i.2] ETSI TR 103 309: "CYBER; Secure by Default - platform security technology".

[i.3] NIST Special Publication 800-63B: "Digital Identity Guidelines - Authentication and Lifecycle Management".

NOTE: Available at <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63b.pdf>.

[i.4] ISO/IEC 29147: "Information technology - Security techniques - Vulnerability Disclosure".

NOTE: Available at <https://www.iso.org/standard/45170.html>.

[i.5] OASIS: "CSAF Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework (CVRF)".

NOTE: Available at <http://docs.oasis-open.org/csaf/csaf-cvrf/v1.2/csaf-cvrf-v1.2.html>.

[i.6] ETSI TR 103 331: "CYBER; Structured threat information sharing".

[i.7] Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).

[i.8] ENISA: "Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT in the context of Critical Information Infrastructures", November 2017, ISBN: 978-92-9204-236-3, doi: 10.2824/03228.

[i.9] UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport: "Secure by Design: Improving the cyber security of consumer Internet of Things Report", March 2018.

NOTE: Available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/secure-by-design>.

[i.10] IoT Security Foundation: "IoT Security Compliance Framework", Release 2 December 2018.

NOTE: Available at <https://www.iotsecurityfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/IoTSF-IoT-Security-Compliance-Framework-Release-2.0-December-2018.pdf>.

[i.11] GSMA: "GSMA IoT Security Guidelines and Assessment".

NOTE: Available at <https://www.gsma.com/iot/iot-security/iot-security-guidelines/>.

[i.12] ETSI TR 103 533: "SmartM2M; Security; Standards Landscape and best practices".

[i.13] Commission Notice: The "Blue Guide" on the implementation of EU products rules 2016 (Text with EEA relevance), 2016/C 272/01.

NOTE: Available in the Official Journal of the European Union, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=OJ:C:2016:272:TOC>.

[i.14] Copper Horse: "Mapping Security & Privacy in the Internet of Things".

NOTE: Available at <https://iotsecuritymapping.uk/>.

- [i.15] ENISA: "Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT - Interactive Tool".
NOTE: Available at <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/iot-and-smart-infrastructures/iot/baseline-security-recommendations-for-iot-interactive-tool>.
- [i.16] IoT Security Foundation: "Understanding the Contemporary Use of Vulnerability Disclosure in Consumer Internet of Things Product Companies".
NOTE: Available at <https://www.iotsecurityfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Vulnerability-Disclosure-Design-v4.pdf>.
- [i.17] F-Secure: "IoT threats: Explosion of 'smart' devices filling up homes leads to increasing risks".
NOTE: Available at <https://blog.f-secure.com/iot-threats/>.
- [i.18] W3C: "Web of Things at W3C".
NOTE: Available at <https://www.w3.org/WoT/>.
- [i.19] ETSI TS 103 701: "CYBER; Cybersecurity assessment for consumer IoT products".
NOTE: It is under development.
- [i.20] DIN SPEC 27072: "Information Technology - IoT capable devices - Minimum requirements for Information security".
- [i.21] GSMA: "Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) Programme".
NOTE: Available at <https://www.gsma.com/security/gsma-coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure-programme/>.
- [i.22] IoT Security Foundation: "Vulnerability Disclosure - Best Practice Guidelines".
NOTE: Available at https://www.iotsecurityfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Vulnerability-Disclosure_WG4_2017.pdf.
- [i.23] OWASP Internet of Things (IoT) Top 10 2018.
NOTE: Available at https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Project#tab=IoT_Top_10.
- [i.24] IEEE 802.15.4™-2015: "IEEE Standard for Low-Rate Wireless Networks".
NOTE: Available at https://standards.ieee.org/content/ieee-standards/en/standard/802_15_4-2015.html.
- [i.25] ETSI TS 102 221: "Smart Cards; UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics".
- [i.26] GSMA: "SGP.22 Technical Specification v2.2.1".
- [i.27] ISO/IEC 27005:2018: "Information technology - Security techniques - Information security risk management".
- [i.28] Microsoft Corporation: "The STRIDE Threat Model".
NOTE: Available at [https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee823878\(v=cs.20\).aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee823878(v=cs.20).aspx).
- [i.29] ETSI TR 121 905: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications (3GPP TR 21.905)".

3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations

3.1 Terms

For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply:

administrator: user who has the highest-privilege level possible for a user of the device, which can mean they are able to change any configuration related to the intended functionality

associated services: digital services that, together with the device, are part of the overall consumer IoT product and that are typically required to provide the product's intended functionality

EXAMPLE 1: Associated services can include mobile applications, cloud computing/storage and third party Application Programming Interfaces (APIs).

EXAMPLE 2: A device transmits telemetry data to a third-party service chosen by the device manufacturer. This service is an associated service.

authentication mechanism: method used to prove the authenticity of an entity

NOTE: An "entity" can be either a user or machine.

EXAMPLE: An authentication mechanism can be the requesting of a password, scanning a QR code, or use of a biometric fingerprint scanner.

authentication value: individual value of an attribute used by an authentication mechanism

EXAMPLE: When the authentication mechanism is to request a password, the authentication value can be a character string. When the authentication mechanism is a biometric fingerprint recognition, the authentication value can be the index fingerprint of the left hand.

best practice cryptography: cryptography that is suitable for the corresponding use case and has no indications of a feasible attack with current readily available techniques

NOTE 1: This does not refer only to the cryptographic primitives used, but also implementation, key generation and handling of keys.

NOTE 2: Multiple organizations, such as SDOs and public authorities, maintain guides and catalogues of cryptographic methods that can be used.

EXAMPLE: The device manufacturer uses a communication protocol and cryptographic library provided with the IoT platform and where that library and protocol have been assessed against feasible attacks, such as replay.

constrained device: device which has physical limitations in either the ability to process data, the ability to communicate data, the ability to store data or the ability to interact with the user, due to restrictions that arise from its intended use

NOTE 1: Physical limitations can be due to power supply, battery life, processing power, physical access, limited functionality, limited memory or limited network bandwidth. These limitations can require a constrained device to be supported by another device, such as a base station or companion device.

EXAMPLE 1: A window sensor's battery cannot be charged or changed by the user; this is a constrained device.

EXAMPLE 2: The device cannot have its software updated due to storage limitations, resulting in hardware replacement or network isolation being the only options to manage a security vulnerability.

EXAMPLE 3: A low-powered device uses a battery to enable it to be deployed in a range of locations. Performing high power cryptographic operations would quickly reduce the battery life, so it relies on a base station or hub to perform validations on updates.

EXAMPLE 4: The device has no display screen to validate binding codes for Bluetooth pairing.

EXAMPLE 5: The device has no ability to input, such as via a keyboard, authentication information.

NOTE 2: A device that has a wired power supply and can support IP-based protocols and the cryptographic primitives used by those protocols is not constrained.

EXAMPLE 6: A device is mains powered and communicates primarily using TLS (Transport Layer Security).

consumer: natural person who is acting for purposes that are outside her/his trade, business, craft or profession

NOTE: Organizations, including businesses of any size, use consumer IoT. For example, Smart TVs are frequently deployed in meeting rooms, and home security kits can protect the premises of small businesses.

consumer IoT device: network-connected (and network-connectable) device that has relationships to associated services and are used by the consumer typically in the home or as electronic wearables

NOTE 1: Consumer IoT devices are commonly also used in business contexts. These devices remain classified as consumer IoT devices.

NOTE 2: Consumer IoT devices are often available for the consumer to purchase in retail environments. Consumer IoT devices can also be commissioned and/or installed professionally.

critical security parameter: security-related secret information whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a security module

EXAMPLE: Secret cryptographic keys, authentication values such as passwords, PINs, private components of certificates.

debug interface: physical interface used by the manufacturer to communicate with the device during development or to perform triage of issues with the device and that is not used as part of the consumer-facing functionality

EXAMPLE: Test points, UART, SWD, JTAG.

defined support period: minimum length of time, expressed as a period or by an end-date, for which a manufacturer will provide security updates

NOTE: This definition focuses on security aspects and not other aspects related to product support such as warranty.

device manufacturer: entity that creates an assembled final consumer IoT product, which is likely to contain the products and components of many other suppliers

factory default: state of the device after factory reset or after final production/assembly

NOTE: This includes the physical device and software (including firmware) that is present on it after assembly.

initialization: process that activates the network connectivity of the device for operation and optionally sets authentication features for a user or for network access

initialized state: state of the device after initialization

IoT product: consumer IoT device and its associated services

isolable: able to be removed from the network it is connected to, where any functionality loss caused is related only to that connectivity and not to its main function; alternatively, able to be placed in a self-contained environment with other devices if and only if the integrity of devices within that environment can be ensured

EXAMPLE: A Smart Fridge has a touchscreen-based interface that is network-connected. This interface can be removed without stopping the fridge from keeping the contents chilled.

logical interface: software implementation that utilizes a network interface to communicate over the network via channels or ports

manufacturer: relevant economic operator in the supply chain (including the device manufacturer)

NOTE: This definition acknowledges the variety of actors involved in the consumer IoT ecosystem and the complex ways by which they can share responsibilities. Beyond the device manufacturer, such entities can also be, for example and depending on a specific case at hand: importers, distributors, integrators, component and platform providers, software providers, IT and telecommunications service providers, managed service providers and providers of associated services.

network interface: physical interface that can be used to access the functionality of consumer IoT via a network

owner: user who owns or who purchased the device

personal data: any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person

NOTE: This term is used to align with well-known terminology but has no legal meaning within the present document.

physical interface: physical port or air interface (such as radio, audio or optical) used to communicate with the device at the physical layer

EXAMPLE: Radios, ethernet ports, serial interfaces such as USB, and those used for debugging.

public security parameter: security related public information whose modification can compromise the security of a security module

EXAMPLE 1: A public key to verify the authenticity/integrity of software updates.

EXAMPLE 2: Public components of certificates.

remotely accessible: intended to be accessible from outside the local network

security module: set of hardware, software, and/or firmware that implements security functions

EXAMPLE: A device contains a hardware root of trust, a cryptographic software library that operates within a trusted execution environment, and software within the operating system that enforces security such as user separation and the update mechanism. These all make up the security module.

security update: software update that addresses security vulnerabilities either discovered by or reported to the manufacturer

NOTE: Software updates can be purely security updates if the severity of the vulnerability requires a higher priority fix.

sensitive security parameters: critical security parameters and public security parameters

software service: software component of a device that is used to support functionality

EXAMPLE: A runtime for the programming language used within the device software or a daemon that exposes an API used by the device software, e.g. a cryptographic module's API.

telemetry: data from a device that can provide information to help the manufacturer identify issues or information related to device usage

EXAMPLE: A consumer IoT device reports software malfunctions to the manufacturer enabling them to identify and remedy the cause.

unique per device: unique for each individual device of a given product class or type

user: natural person or organization

3.2 Symbols

Void.

3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

API	Application Programming Interface
ASLR	Address Space Layout Randomization
CVD	Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure
CVRF	Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
DSC	Dedicated Security Components
ENISA	European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
EU	European Union
GDPR	General Data Protection Regulation
GSMA	GSM Association
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IoT	Internet of Things
IP	Internet Protocol
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
JTAG	Joint Test Action Group
LAN	Local Area Network
LoRaWAN	Long Range Wide Area Network
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OTP	One-Time Password
QR	Quick Response
SBOM	Software Bill of Materials
SDO	Standards Development Organization
SE	Secure Elements
SWD	Serial Wire Debug
TEE	Trusted Execution Environment
TS	Technical Specification
UART	Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter
UI	User Interface
USB	Universal Serial Bus
WAN	Wide Area Network

4 Reporting implementation

The implementation of provisions in the present document is informed by risk assessment and threat modelling (such as ISO/IEC 27005:2018 [i.27] and STRIDE Threat Model [i.28]); this is performed by the device manufacturer and/or other relevant entities and is out of scope of the present document. For certain use cases and following risk assessment, it can be appropriate to apply additional provisions as well as those contained within the present document.

The present document sets a security baseline; however, due to the broad landscape of consumer IoT it is recognized that the applicability of provisions is dependent on each device. The present document provides a degree of flexibility through the use of non-mandatory "should" provisions (recommendations).

Provision 4-1 A justification shall be recorded for each recommendation in the present document that is considered to be not applicable for or not fulfilled by the consumer IoT device.

Table B.1 provides a schema to record these justifications in a structured manner. This is to allow other stakeholders (e.g. assurance assessors, members of the supply chain, security researchers or retailers) to determine whether provisions have been applied correctly and appropriately.

EXAMPLE 1: The manufacturer publishes a completed version of table B.1 alongside the product description on their website.

EXAMPLE 2: The manufacturer completes table B.1 for internal record keeping. Sometime later, an external assurance organization assesses a product against the present document and requests information relating to the product's security design. The manufacturer can easily provide this information as it is contained within table B.1.

Cases where a provision is not applicable or not fulfilled by the consumer IoT device can include:

- when a device is a constrained device in such a way that implementation of certain security measures is not possible or not appropriate to the identified risk (security or privacy);
- where the functionality described in the provision is not included (e.g. a device that only presents data without requiring authentication).

EXAMPLE 3: A window sensor with a limited battery life sends alerts via a remote associated service when triggered and is controlled via a hub. Due to its limited battery life and processing power compared to other consumer IoT devices, it is a constrained device. In addition, because the user controls the device via a hub, the user does not need to use passwords, or other authentication mechanisms, to directly authenticate to the device.

5 Cyber security provisions for consumer IoT

5.1 No universal default passwords

Provision 5.1-1 Where passwords are used and in any state other than the factory default, all consumer IoT device passwords shall be unique per device or defined by the user.

NOTE 1: There are many mechanisms used for performing authentication, and passwords are not the only mechanism for authenticating a user to a device. However if they are used, following best practice on passwords is encouraged according to NIST Special Publication 800-63B [i.3]. Using passwords for machine to machine authentication is generally not appropriate.

Many consumer IoT devices are sold with universal default usernames and passwords (such as "admin, admin") for user interfaces through to network protocols. Continued usage of universal default values has been the source of many security issues in IoT [i.17] and the practice needs to be discontinued. The above provision can be achieved by the use of pre-installed passwords that are unique per device and/or by requiring the user to choose a password that follows best practice as part of initialization, or by some other method that does not use passwords.

EXAMPLE 1: During initialization a device generates certificates that are used to authenticate a user to the device via an associated service like a mobile application.

To increase security, multi-factor authentication, such as use of a password plus OTP procedure, can be used to better protect the device or an associated service. Device security can further be strengthened by having unique and immutable identities.

Provision 5.1-2 Where pre-installed unique per device passwords are used, these shall be generated with a mechanism that reduces the risk of automated attacks against a class or type of device.

EXAMPLE 2: Pre-installed passwords are sufficiently randomized.

As a counter-example, passwords with incremental counters (such as "password1", "password2" and so on) are easily guessable. Further, using a password that is related in an obvious way to public information (sent over the air or within a network), such as MAC address or Wi-Fi® SSID, can allow for password retrieval using automated means.

Provision 5.1-3 Authentication mechanisms used to authenticate users against a device shall use best practice cryptography, appropriate to the properties of the technology, risk and usage.

Provision 5.1-4 Where a user can authenticate against a device, the device shall provide to the user or an administrator a simple mechanism to change the authentication value used.

EXAMPLE 3: For biometric authentication values the device manufacturer allows this change in authentication value through retraining against a new biometric.

EXAMPLE 4: A parent in a household creates an account on the device for their child and selects and manages the PIN or password that the child uses. The parent is an administrator on the device and can restrict the child from changing the PIN or password.

EXAMPLE 5: To make it simple for the user to change a password, the manufacturer designs the password change process in a way that it requires a minimal number of steps. The manufacturer explains the process in a user manual and in a video tutorial.

An authentication mechanism used for authenticating users, whether it be a fingerprint, password or other token, needs to have its value changeable. This is easier when this mechanism is part of the normal usage flow of the device.

Provision 5.1-5 When the device is not a constrained device, it shall have a mechanism available which makes brute-force attacks on authentication mechanisms via network interfaces impracticable.

EXAMPLE 6: A device has a limitation on the number of authentication attempts within a certain time interval. It also uses increasing time intervals between attempts.

EXAMPLE 7: The client application is able to lock an account or to delay additional authentication attempts after a limited number of failed authentication attempts.

This provision addresses attacks that perform "credential stuffing" or exhaust an entire key-space. It is important that these types of attacks are detected by the consumer IoT device and defended against, whilst guarding against a related threat of 'resource exhaustion' and denial of service attacks.

5.2 Implement a means to manage reports of vulnerabilities

Provision 5.2-1 The manufacturer shall make a vulnerability disclosure policy publicly available. This policy shall include, at a minimum:

- contact information for the reporting of issues; and
- information on timelines for:
 - 1) initial acknowledgement of receipt; and
 - 2) status updates until the resolution of the reported issues.

A vulnerability disclosure policy clearly specifies the process through which security researchers and others are able to report issues. Such policy can be updated as necessary to further ensure transparency and clarity in the dealings of the manufacturer with security researchers, and vice versa.

Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) is a set of processes for dealing with disclosures about potential security vulnerabilities and to support the remediation of these vulnerabilities. CVD is standardized by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in the ISO/IEC 29147 [i.4] on vulnerability disclosure and has been proven to be successful in some large software companies around the world.

In the IoT industry, CVD is currently not well-established [i.16] as some companies are reticent about dealing with security researchers. Here, CVD provides companies a framework to manage this process. This gives security researchers an avenue to inform companies of security issues, puts companies ahead of the threat of malicious exploitation and gives companies an opportunity to respond to and resolve vulnerabilities in advance of a public disclosure.

Provision 5.2-2 Disclosed vulnerabilities should be acted on in a timely manner.

A "timely manner" for acting on vulnerabilities varies considerably and is incident-specific; however, conventionally, the vulnerability process is completed within 90 days for a software solution, including availability of patches and notification of the issue. A hardware fix can take considerably longer to address than a software fix. Additionally, a fix that has to be deployed to devices can take time to roll out compared with a server software fix.

Provision 5.2-3 Manufacturers should continually monitor for, identify and rectify security vulnerabilities within products and services they sell, produce, have produced and services they operate during the defined support period.

NOTE 1: Manufacturers are expected to exercise due care for all software and hardware components used in the product, this includes due care related to the selected third parties that provide associated services to support the functions of the product.

Software solutions often contain open source and third party software components. Creating and maintaining list of all software components and their sub-components is a pre-requisite to be able to monitor for product vulnerabilities. Various tools exist to scan source code and binaries and build a so-called Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), which identifies third party components and the versions used in the product. This information is then used to monitor for the associated security and licensing risks of each identified software component.

Vulnerabilities are expected to be reported directly to the affected stakeholders in the first instance. If that is not possible, vulnerabilities can be reported to national authorities. Manufacturers are also encouraged to share information with competent industry bodies, such as the GSMA [i.21] and the IoT Security Foundation. Guidance on Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure is available from the IoT Security Foundation [i.22] which references ISO/IEC 29147 [i.4].

This is expected to be performed for devices within their defined support period. However, manufacturers can continue this outside that period and release security updates to rectify vulnerabilities.

Manufacturers that provide IoT products have a duty of care to consumers and third parties who can be harmed by their failure to have a CVD programme in place. Additionally, companies that share this information through industry bodies can assist others who can be suffering from the same problem.

Disclosures can comprise different approaches depending on the circumstances:

- Vulnerabilities related to single products or services: the problem is expected to be reported directly to the affected stakeholder (usually the device manufacturer, IoT service provider or mobile application developer). The source of these reports can be security researchers or industry peers.
- Systemic vulnerabilities: a stakeholder, such as a device manufacturer, can discover a problem that is potentially systemic. Whilst fixing it in the device manufacturer's own product is crucial, there is significant benefit to industry and consumers from sharing this information. Similarly, security researchers can also seek to report such systemic vulnerabilities. For systemic vulnerabilities, a relevant competent industry body can coordinate a wider scale response.

NOTE 2: The Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework (CVRF) [i.5] can also be useful to exchange information on security vulnerabilities.

Cyber security threat information sharing can support organizations in developing and producing secure products according to ETSI TR 103 331 [i.6].

5.3 Keep software updated

Developing and deploying security updates in a timely manner is one of the most important actions a manufacturer can take to protect its customers and the wider technical ecosystem. It is good practice that all software is kept updated and well maintained.

Each provision from 5.3-3 to 5.3-12 is dependent upon an update mechanism being implemented, as per provision 5.3-1 or 5.3-2.

Provision 5.3-1 All software components in consumer IoT devices should be securely updateable.

NOTE 1: Managing software updates successfully generally relies on communication of version information for software components between the device and the manufacturer.

Not all software on a device will be updateable.

EXAMPLE 1: The first stage boot loader on a device is written once to device storage and from then on is immutable.

EXAMPLE 2: On devices with several microcontrollers (e.g. one for communication and one for the application) some of them might not be updateable.

Provision 5.3-2 When the device is not a constrained device, it shall have an update mechanism for the secure installation of updates.

NOTE 2: There are cases where provision 5.3-1 applies even where 5.3-2 does not.

"Securely updateable" and "secure installation" means that there are adequate measures to prevent an attacker misusing the update mechanism.

EXAMPLE 3: Measures can include the use of authentic software update servers, integrity protected communications channels, verifying the authenticity and integrity of software updates. It is recognized that there are great variances in software update mechanisms and what constitutes "installation".

EXAMPLE 4: An anti-rollback policy based on version checking can be used to prevent downgrade attacks.

Update mechanisms can range from the device downloading the update directly from a remote server, transmitted from a mobile application or transferred over a USB or other physical interface. If an attacker compromises this mechanism, it allows for a malicious version of the software to be installed on the device.

Provision 5.3-3 An update shall be simple for the user to apply.

Provision 5.3-4 Automatic mechanisms should be used for software updates.

The degree of simplicity depends on the design and intended usage of the device. An update that is simple to apply will be automatically applied, initiated using an associated service (such as a mobile application), or via a web interface on the device. If an update is difficult to apply, then that increases the chance that a user will repeatedly defer updating the device, leaving it in a vulnerable state.

If an automatic update fails, then a user can, in some circumstances, no longer be able to use a device. Detection mechanisms such as watchdogs and the use of dual-bank flash or recovery partitions can ensure that the device returns to either a known good version or the factory state.

Security updates can be provided for devices in a preventative manner, as part of automatic updates, which can remove security vulnerabilities before they are exploited. Managing this can be complex, especially if there are parallel associated service updates, device updates and other service updates to deal with. Therefore, a clear management and deployment plan is beneficial to the manufacturer, as is transparency to consumers about the current state of update support.

In many cases, publishing software updates involves multiple dependencies on other organizations such as manufacturers that produce sub-components; however, this is not a reason to withhold updates. It can be useful for the manufacturer to consider the entire software supply chain in the development and deployment of security updates.

It is often advisable not to bundle security updates with more complex software updates, such as feature updates. A feature update that introduces new functionality can trigger additional requirements and delay delivery of the update to devices.

EXAMPLE 5: Under the EU Product Legislation, a feature update could change the intended use of a device and thus turn it into a new product, requiring a new conformity assessment to be conducted. However, a software update with limited impact could be considered a maintenance update which would not require a new conformity assessment. More information on the impact of software updates in the context of the EU Product Legislation can be found in the Blue Guide [i.13].

Provision 5.3-5 The device should check after initialization, and then periodically, whether security updates are available.

EXAMPLE 6: The user could be shown the existence of updates via the interface with which the device is initialized.

EXAMPLE 7: A device checks for available updates daily at a randomized time.

For some products, it can be more appropriate for the associated service, rather than the device, to perform such checks.

Provision 5.3-6 If the device supports automatic updates and/or update notifications, these should be enabled in the initialized state and configurable so that the user can enable, disable, or postpone installation of security updates and/or update notifications.

It is important from a consumer rights and ownership perspective that the user is in control of whether or not they receive updates. There are good reasons why a user may choose not to update, including security. In addition, if an update is deployed and subsequently found to cause issues, manufacturers can ask users to not upgrade their software in order that those devices are not affected.

Provision 5.3-7 The device shall use best practice cryptography to facilitate secure update mechanisms.

Provision 5.3-8 Security updates shall be timely.

"Timely" in the context of security updates can vary, depending on the particular issue and fix, as well as other factors such as the ability to reach a device or constrained device considerations. It is important that a security update that fixes a critical vulnerability (i.e. one with potentially adverse effects of a large scale) is handled with appropriate priority by the manufacturer. Due to the complex structure of modern software and the ubiquity of communication platforms, multiple stakeholders can be involved in a security update.

EXAMPLE 8: A particular software update involves a third party vendor of software libraries, an IoT device manufacturer, and an IoT service platform operator. Collaboration between these stakeholders ensures appropriate timeliness of the software update.

Provision 5.3-9 The device should verify the authenticity and integrity of software updates.

A common approach for confirming that an update is valid is to verify its integrity and authenticity. This can be done on the device; however, constrained devices can have power limitations that make performing cryptographic operations costly. In such cases, verification can be performed by another device that is trusted to perform this verification. The verified update would then be sent over a secure channel to the device. Performing verification of updates at a hub and then on the device, can reduce the risk of compromise.

It is good practice for a device to act upon the detection of an invalid and potentially malicious update. Beyond rejecting the update, and without limitation, it can report the incident to an appropriate service and/or inform the user. In addition, mitigating controls can be put in place to prevent an attacker from bypassing or misusing an update mechanism. Giving the attacker as little information as possible as part of the update mechanism reduces their ability to exploit it.

EXAMPLE 9: When a device detects that an update could not be delivered or applied successfully (by failing integrity or authentication checks), the device can mitigate information leakage by not providing any information about the failure to the initiator of the update process. However, the device can generate a log entry and deliver notification of the log entry to a trusted peer (e.g. a device administrator) over a secure channel, so that the occurrence of the incident is known and the owner or administrator of the device can make an appropriate response.

Provision 5.3-10 Where updates are delivered over a network interface, the device shall verify the authenticity and integrity of each update via a trust relationship.

NOTE 3: Valid trust relationships include: authenticated communication channels, presence on a network that requires the device to possess a critical security parameter or password to join, digital signature based verification of the update, or confirmation by the user.

NOTE 4: The validation of the trust relationship is essential to ensure that a non-authorized entity (e.g. device management platform or device) cannot install malicious code.

Provision 5.3-11 The manufacturer should inform the user in a recognizable and apparent manner that a security update is required together with information on the risks mitigated by that update.

EXAMPLE 10: The manufacturer informs the user that an update is required via a notification on the user interface or via an email.

Provision 5.3-12 The device should notify the user when the application of a software update will disrupt the basic functioning of the device.

NOTE 5: This is not necessary if a notification is made by an associated service.

This notification can include extra detail, such as the approximate expected duration for which the device will be offline.

EXAMPLE 11: A notification includes information about the urgency and approximate expected duration of downtime.

It can be critical for users that a device continues to operate during an update. This is why the provision above recommends to notify the user when an update will disrupt functionality where possible. Particularly, devices that fulfil a safety-relevant function are expected not to turn completely off in the case of an update; some minimal system functional capability is expected. Disruption to functionality can become a critical safety issue for some types of devices and systems if not considered or managed correctly.

EXAMPLE 12: During an update, a watch will continue to display the time, a home thermostat will continue to maintain a reasonable temperature and a Smart Lock will continue to lock and unlock a door.

Provision 5.3-13 The manufacturer shall publish, in an accessible way that is clear and transparent to the user, the defined support period.

When purchasing a product, the consumer expects this period of software update support to be made clear.

Provision 5.3-14 For constrained devices that cannot have their software updated, the rationale for the absence of software updates, the period and method of hardware replacement support and a defined support period should be published by the manufacturer in an accessible way that is clear and transparent to the user.

Provision 5.3-15 For constrained devices that cannot have their software updated, the product should be isolable and the hardware replaceable.

There are some situations where devices cannot be patched. For constrained devices a replacement plan needs to be in place and be clearly communicated to the consumer. This plan would typically detail a schedule for when technologies will need to be replaced and, where applicable, when support for hardware and software ends.

Provision 5.3-16 The model designation of the consumer IoT device shall be clearly recognizable, either by labelling on the device or via a physical interface.

This is often performed by communicating with a device over a logical interface, however it can also be part of a UI.

EXAMPLE 13: A device has a HTTP (or HTTPS when appropriate) API that reports the model designation (after user authentication).

Knowledge of the specific designation of the device is often required to check the defined support period of software updates or the availability of software updates.

5.4 Securely store sensitive security parameters

Provision 5.4-1 Sensitive security parameters in persistent storage shall be stored securely by the device.

Secure storage mechanisms can be used to secure sensitive security parameters. Appropriate mechanisms include those provided by a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), encrypted storage associated with the hardware, Secure Elements (SE) or Dedicated Security Components (DSC), and processing capabilities of software running on a UICC, according to ETSI TS 121 905 [i.29], ETSI TS 102 221 [i.25]/embedded UICC according to GSMA SGP.22 Technical Specification v.2.2.1 [i.26].

NOTE: This provision applies to persistent storage, but manufacturers can also implement similar approaches for sensitive security parameters in memory.

EXAMPLE 1: The root keys involved in authorization and access to licensed radio frequencies (e.g. LTE-m cellular access) are stored in a UICC.

EXAMPLE 2: A remote controlled door-lock using a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to store and access the sensitive security parameters.

EXAMPLE 3: A wireless thermostat stores the credentials for the wireless network in a tamper protected microcontroller rather than in external flash storage.

Provision 5.4-2 Where a hard-coded unique per device identity is used in a device for security purposes, it shall be implemented in such a way that it resists tampering by means such as physical, electrical or software.

EXAMPLE 4: A master key used for network access that is unique to the device is stored in UICC which is compliant to relevant ETSI standards (see, for example ETSI TS 102 221 [i.25]).

Provision 5.4-3 Hard-coded critical security parameters in device software source code shall not be used.

Reverse engineering of devices and applications can easily discover credentials such as hard-coded usernames and passwords in software. These credentials can also be API keys that allow usage of security-sensitive functions in a remote service, or private keys used in the security of protocols that the device uses to communicate. Such credentials will often be found within source-code, which is well-known bad practice. Simple obfuscation methods also used to obscure or encrypt this hard-coded information can be trivially broken.

Provision 5.4-4 Any critical security parameters used for integrity and authenticity checks of software updates and for protection of communication with associated services in device software shall be unique per device and shall be produced with a mechanism that reduces the risk of automated attacks against classes of devices.

EXAMPLE 5: A different symmetric key is deployed on every device of the same product class for generating and verifying message authentication codes for software updates.

EXAMPLE 6: The device uses the manufacturer's public key to verify a software update. This is not a critical security parameter and does not need to be unique per device.

Provisioning a device with unique critical security parameters helps to protect the integrity and authenticity of software updates as well as the communication of the device with associated services. If global critical security parameters are used, their disclosure can enable wide-scale attacks on other IoT devices such as to enable the creation of botnets.

5.5 Communicate securely

Provision 5.5-1 The consumer IoT device shall use best practice cryptography to communicate securely.

Appropriateness of security controls and the use of best practice cryptography is dependent on many factors including the usage context. As security is ever-evolving it is difficult to give prescriptive advice about cryptography or other security measures without the risk of such advice quickly becoming obsolete.

Provision 5.5-2 The consumer IoT device should use reviewed or evaluated implementations to deliver network and security functionalities, particularly in the field of cryptography.

Reviews and evaluations can involve an independent internal or external entity.

EXAMPLE 1: Distributed software libraries within the development and test community, certified software modules, and hardware equipment crypto-service providers (such as the Secure Element and Trust Execution Environment) are all reviewed or evaluated.

Provision 5.5-3 Cryptographic algorithms and primitives should be updateable.

NOTE 1: This is also known as "cryptoagility".

For devices that cannot be updated, it is important that the intended lifetime of the device does not exceed the recommended usage lifetime of cryptographic algorithms used by the device (including key sizes).

Provision 5.5-4 Access to device functionality via a network interface in the initialized state should only be possible after authentication on that interface.

NOTE 2: Functionality can vary significantly on the use case and can encompass a range of things, including access to personal data and device actuators.

There are devices that provide public, open data for example in the Web of Things [i.18]. These devices are accessible without authentication to provide open access to all.

The device can be compromised via vulnerabilities in network services. A suitable authentication mechanism can protect against unauthorized access and can contribute to defence-in-depth in the device.

Provision 5.5-5 Device functionality that allows security-relevant changes in configuration via a network interface shall only be accessible after authentication. The exception is for network service protocols that are relied upon by the device and where the manufacturer cannot guarantee what configuration will be required for the device to operate.

NOTE 3: Protocols that are an exception include ARP, DHCP, DNS, ICMP, and NTP.

EXAMPLE 2: Security-relevant changes include permission management, configuration of network keys and password changes.

Provision 5.5-6 Critical security parameters should be encrypted in transit, with such encryption appropriate to the properties of the technology, risk and usage.

Provision 5.5-7 The consumer IoT device shall protect the confidentiality of critical security parameters that are communicated via remotely accessible network interfaces.

Many different methods exist for enrolment and authentication. Some authentication values are provided by out-of-band authentication mechanisms, such as a QR code, and some are human-readable, such as a password.

Where an authentication mechanism uses unique values per authentication attempt (e.g. in a challenge-response mechanism or when using one time passwords as a second factor), the response is not the authentication value itself. However, it is still good practice to apply confidentiality protection to those values.

Confidentiality protection can be achieved using an encrypted communication channel or payload encryption. This is often done using protocols or algorithms at least as strong as the key material transmitted, however other mitigations, such as the need for special proximity, are available.

Provision 5.5-8 The manufacturer shall follow secure management processes for critical security parameters that relate to the device.

The use of open, peer-reviewed standards for critical security parameters (commonly referred to as "key management") is strongly encouraged.

5.6 Minimize exposed attack surfaces

The "principle of least privilege" is a foundation stone of good security engineering, applicable to IoT as much as in any other field of application.

Provision 5.6-1 All unused network and logical interfaces shall be disabled.

EXAMPLE 1: An administrative UI that is supposed to be accessed from the LAN is not accessible from the WAN by default.

EXAMPLE 2: A Direct Firmware Update (DFU) service exposed over Bluetooth Low Energy is used for development but not expected to be used in production. It is disabled in the final product.

Provision 5.6-2 In the initialized state, the network interfaces of the device shall minimize the unauthenticated disclosure of security-relevant information.

Security-relevant information can be exposed over a network interface as part of the initialization process. When security-relevant information is shared by a device when establishing a connection, it can be used by attackers to identify vulnerable devices.

EXAMPLE 3: When finding vulnerable devices throughout the whole IP address space, security-relevant information could be information about the device configuration, kernel version or software version.

Provision 5.6-3 Device hardware should not unnecessarily expose physical interfaces to attack.

Physical interfaces can be used by an attacker to compromise firmware or memory on a device. "Unnecessarily" refers to the manufacturer's assessment of the benefits of an open interface, used for user functionality or for debugging purposes.

EXAMPLE 4: A micro-USB port meant to be used to power the device only is physically configured so as not to also allow command or debug operations.

Provision 5.6-4 Where a debug interface is physically accessible, it shall be disabled in software.

EXAMPLE 5: A UART serial interface is disabled through the bootloader software on the device. No logon prompt and no interactive menu is available due to this disabling.

Provision 5.6-5 The manufacturer should only enable software services that are used or required for the intended use or operation of the device.

EXAMPLE 6: The manufacturer does not provision the device with any background processes, kernel extensions, commands, programs or tools that are not required for the intended use.

Provision 5.6-6 Code should be minimized to the functionality necessary for the service/device to operate.

EXAMPLE 7: "Dead" or unused code is removed and not considered to be benign.

Provision 5.6-7 Software should run with least necessary privileges, taking account of both security and functionality.

EXAMPLE 8: Minimal daemons/processes run with "root" privileges. In particular the processes that use network interfaces require unprivileged users rather than requiring a "root" user.

EXAMPLE 9: Applications running on a device that includes a multi-user operating system (e.g. Linux) use different users for each component or service.

Software attacks on devices that aim to corrupt memory can be mitigated through mechanisms such as stack canaries, Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). The manufacturer can use platform security features where they are available to help further reduce the risk. Reducing privileges that they run at and minimizing code also helps to mitigate this risk.

Provision 5.6-8 The device should include a hardware-level access control mechanism for memory.

Software exploits often use the lack of access control in memory to execute malicious code. Access control mechanisms limit whether data in memory on the device can be executed. Suitable mechanisms include technologies such as MMUs or MPUs, executable space protection (e.g. NX bits), memory tagging, and trusted execution environments.

Provision 5.6-9 The manufacturer should follow secure development processes for software deployed on the device.

Secure development processes, including using version control, or enabling security-related compiler options (e.g. stack protection) can help ensure software artefacts are more secure. Manufacturers can use these options when using toolchains that support them.

5.7 Ensure software integrity

Provision 5.7-1 The consumer IoT device should verify its software using secure boot mechanisms.

A hardware root of trust is one way to provide strong attestation as part of a secure boot mechanism. A hardware root of trust is a component of a system from which all other components derive their "trust" - i.e. the source of cryptographic trust within that system. To fulfil its function, the hardware root of trust is reliable and resistant to both physical and logical tampering, as there is no mechanism to determine that the component has failed or been altered. By utilizing a hardware root of trust, a device can have confidence in results of cryptographic functions, such as those utilized for secure boot. A hardware root of trust can be either backed by mechanisms used for secure storage of credentials or other alternatives providing baseline levels of security assurance proportionate to the required level of security for a given device.

Provision 5.7-2 If an unauthorized change is detected to the software, the device should alert the user and/or administrator to the issue and should not connect to wider networks than those necessary to perform the alerting function.

The ability to recover remotely from unauthorized changes can rely on a known good state, such as locally storing a known good version to enable safe recovery and updating of the device. This will avoid denial of service and costly recalls or maintenance visits, whilst managing the risk of potential takeover of the device by an attacker subverting update or other network communications mechanisms.

If a consumer IoT device detects an unauthorized change to its software, it will be able to inform the right stakeholder. In some cases, devices can have the ability to be in administration mode.

EXAMPLE: A thermostat in a room can have a user mode; this mode prevents changing of other settings. If an unauthorized change to software is detected, an alert to the administrator is appropriate, as the administrator has the ability to act on the alert (whereas a user does not).

NOTE: An attack that forces a device to revert to a known good state can introduce a DoS risk if the device is unable to successfully perform this or if the attacker is able to repeatedly cause this effect.

5.8 Ensure that personal data is secure

Provision 5.8-1 The confidentiality of personal data transiting between a device and a service, especially associated services, should be protected, with best practice cryptography.

Provision 5.8-2 The confidentiality of sensitive personal data communicated between the device and associated services shall be protected, with cryptography appropriate to the properties of the technology and usage.

NOTE 1: In the context of this provision, "sensitive personal data" is data whose disclosure has a high potential to cause harm to the individual. What is to be treated as "sensitive personal data" varies across products and use cases, but examples are: video stream of a home security camera, payment information, content of communication data and timestamped location data. Carrying out security and data protection impact assessments can help the manufacturer make appropriate choices.

NOTE 2: Associated services in this context are typically cloud services. Moreover these services are controlled or can be influenced by the manufacturer. These services typically are not operated by the user.

NOTE 3: Confidentiality protection often includes integrity protection according to best practice cryptography.

Provision 5.8-3 All external sensing capabilities of the device shall be documented in an accessible way that is clear and transparent for the user.

EXAMPLE: An external sensing capability can be an optic or acoustic sensor.

Clause 6 of the present document contains provisions specific to protecting personal data.

5.9 Make systems resilient to outages

The aim of the provisions in the present clause is to ensure that IoT services are kept up and running as the adoption of IoT devices across all aspects of a consumer's life increases, including in functions that are relevant to personal safety. It is important to note that safety-related regulations can apply, but the key is to avoid making outages the cause of impact on the user and to design products and services that provide a level of resilience to these challenges.

Provision 5.9-1 Resilience should be built in to consumer IoT devices and services, taking into account the possibility of outages of data networks and power.

Provision 5.9-2 Consumer IoT devices should remain operating and locally functional in the case of a loss of network access and should recover cleanly in the case of restoration of a loss of power.

NOTE: "Recovering cleanly" normally involves resuming connectivity and functionality in the same or improved state.

Provision 5.9-3 The consumer IoT device should connect to networks in an expected, operational and stable state and in an orderly fashion, taking the capability of the infrastructure into consideration.

EXAMPLE 1: A Smart Home loses connection to the internet following a power outage. When the network connection is restored, the devices in the home reconnect after a randomized delay to minimize network utilization.

EXAMPLE 2: After making an update available, the manufacturer notifies devices in batches to prevent them all simultaneously downloading the update.

IoT systems and devices are relied upon by consumers for increasingly important use cases that can be safety-relevant or life-impacting. Keeping services running locally if there is a loss of network is one of the measures that can be taken to increase resilience. Other measures can include building redundancy into associated services as well as mitigations against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks or signalling storms, which can be caused by mass-reconnections of devices following an outage. It is expected that the level of resilience necessary is proportionate and determined by usage, with consideration given to others that rely on the system, service or device given that an outage can have a wider impact than expected.

Orderly reconnection means in a manner that takes explicit steps to avoid simultaneous requests, such as for software updates or reconnections, from a large number of IoT devices. Such explicit steps can include the introduction of a random delay before a reconnection attempt according to an incremental back-off mechanism.

5.10 Examine system telemetry data

Provision 5.10-1 If telemetry data is collected from consumer IoT devices and services, such as usage and measurement data, it should be examined for security anomalies.

EXAMPLE 1: Security anomalies can be represented by a deviation from normal behaviour of the device, as expressed by the monitored indicators, for example an abnormal increase of failed login attempts.

EXAMPLE 2: Telemetry from multiple devices allows a manufacturer to notice that updates are failing due to invalid software update authenticity checks.

Examining telemetry, including log data, is useful for security evaluation and allows for unusual circumstances to be identified early and dealt with, minimizing security risk and allowing quick mitigation of problems.

Clause 6 of the present document contains provisions specific to protecting personal data when telemetry data is collected.

5.11 Make it easy for users to delete user data

Provision 5.11-1 The user shall be provided with functionality such that user data can be erased from the device in a simple manner.

NOTE 1: User data in this context means all individual data which is stored on the IoT device including personal data, user configuration and cryptographic material such as user passwords or keys.

Provision 5.11-2 The consumer should be provided with functionality on the device such that personal data can be removed from associated services in a simple manner.

Such functionality is intended for situations when there is a transfer of ownership, when the consumer wishes to delete personal data, when the consumer wishes to remove a service from the device and/or when the consumer wishes to dispose of the device. It is expected that such functionality is compliant to applicable data protection law, including the GDPR [i.7].

Removing personal data "easily" means that minimal steps are required to complete that action that each involve minimal complexity.

Such functionality can potentially present an attack vector.

Provision 5.11-3 Users should be given clear instructions on how to delete their personal data.

Provision 5.11-4 Users should be provided with clear confirmation that personal data has been deleted from services, devices and applications.

Consumer IoT devices often change ownership and will eventually be recycled or disposed of. Mechanisms can be provided that allow the consumer to remain in control and remove personal data from services, devices and applications. When a consumer wishes to completely remove their personal data, they also expect retrospective deletion of backup copies.

Deleting personal data from a device or service is often not simply achieved by resetting a device back to its factory default state. There are many use cases where the consumer is not the owner of a device, but wishes to delete their own personal data from the device and all associated services such as cloud services or mobile applications.

EXAMPLE: A user can have temporary usage of consumer IoT products within a rented apartment. Carrying out a factory reset of the product can remove configuration settings or disable the device to the detriment of the apartment owner and a future user. It would be an inappropriate technical mechanism to delete all personal data in this context.

NOTE 2: Annex A of the present document contains an example model of device states including data storage for each state.

5.12 Make installation and maintenance of devices easy

Provision 5.12-1 Installation and maintenance of consumer IoT should involve minimal decisions by the user and should follow security best practice on usability.

EXAMPLE: The user uses a wizard to setup the device where a subset of configuration options is presented with the common defaults already specified and with appropriate security options already turned on by default.

Provision 5.12-2 The manufacturer should provide users with guidance on how to securely set up their device.

However, the ideal is for a process that involves the minimum of human intervention and which achieves a secure configuration automatically.

Provision 5.12-3 The manufacturer should provide users with guidance on how to check whether their device is securely set up.

Security issues caused by consumer confusion or misconfiguration can be reduced and sometimes eliminated by properly addressing complexity and poor design in user interfaces. Clear guidance to users on how to configure devices securely can also reduce their exposure to threats.

In the general case, the average overhead of securely setting up a device is higher than the average overhead of checking whether a device is securely setup. The check of a secure setup, from a process standpoint, can be undertaken in large by the manufacturer through an automated process that communicates with the device remotely. Part of such an automated process could include validation of the device's capacity to establish a secure communication channel.

5.13 Validate input data

Provision 5.13-1 The consumer IoT device software shall validate data input via user interfaces or transferred via Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) or between networks in services and devices.

Systems can be subverted by incorrectly formatted data or code transferred across different types of interface. Automated tools such as fuzzers can be used by attackers or testers to exploit potential gaps and weaknesses that emerge as a result of not validating data.

EXAMPLE 1: The device receives data that is not of the expected type, for example executable code rather than user inputted text. The software on the device has been written so that the input is parameterized or "escaped", preventing this code from being run.

EXAMPLE 2: Out of range data is received by a temperature sensor, rather than trying to process this input it identifies that it is outside of the possible bounds and is discarded and the event is captured in telemetry.

6 Data protection provisions for consumer IoT

Many consumer IoT devices process personal data. It is expected that manufacturers provide features within consumer IoT devices that support the protection of such personal data. In addition, there exist laws and regulations that relate to the protection of personal data in consumer IoT devices (for example the GDPR [i.7]). The present document intends to help manufacturers of consumer IoT devices provide a number of features for the protection of personal data from a strictly technical perspective.

Provision 6-1 The manufacturer shall provide consumers with clear and transparent information about what personal data is processed, how it is being used, by whom, and for what purposes, for each device and service. This also applies to third parties that can be involved, including advertisers.

Provision 6-2 Where personal data is processed on the basis of consumers' consent, this consent shall be obtained in a valid way.

Obtaining consent "in a valid way" normally involves giving consumers a free, obvious and explicit opt-in choice of whether their personal data can be used for a specified purpose.

Provision 6-3 Consumers who gave consent for the processing of their personal data shall have the capability to withdraw it at any time.

Consumers expect to be able to preserve their privacy by configuring IoT device and service functionality appropriately.

Provision 6-4 If telemetry data is collected from consumer IoT devices and services, the processing of personal data should be kept to the minimum necessary for the intended functionality.

Provision 6-5 If telemetry data is collected from consumer IoT devices and services, consumers shall be provided with information on what telemetry data is collected, how it is being used, by whom, and for what purposes.

Annex A (informative): Basic concepts and models

A.1 Architecture

A consumer IoT device is a collection of hardware and software components, generally with physical interfaces which can also be network interfaces. A general example and a specific "Smart Speaker" sophisticated example are shown below in Figure A.1. These architectures are informative and it is not expected that a device would have all or some of the components pictured.




Figure A.1: Examples of a general architecture of a device and of an architecture for a Smart Speaker

Consumer IoT deployed in the home will often consist of a variety of both constrained and non-constrained devices that will be connected to the LAN, either directly through IP connectivity, such as over Ethernet or Wi-Fi®, or indirectly via a gateway or hub. This indirect connection to the LAN will generally use non-IP connectivity (e.g. protocols based on IEEE 802.15.4 [i.24]). A router will then connect the LAN to the WAN (i.e. the Internet). In some cases, however, a device within the home can connect directly to the WAN over other non-IP or IP connections (such as GSM or LoRaWAN).

Consumer IoT devices in the home will often connect outwards to (or be connected into by) online or local services. In the present document those that are included by the manufacturer (for example telemetry, or a companion mobile application) or that have to be installed as part of the initialization are classed as associated services - in cases where the user chooses to install a service, or access external content then these would not count as associated services. For example, some scenarios:

- websites accessed via a device's browser are likely to not be associated services as the user is deciding to access them, not the developer of the device software;
- software applications (such as an "app" that might be installed on a Smart TV) that run on a device; if they are installed by default, then they would generally be classified as associated services. If, however, they are installed through a store at the choice of the user, then they would not be associated;
- connecting to a telemetry platform would be an associated service as this is usually pre-configured by the device manufacturer.

Figure A.2 provides an example of an architecture for this model of deployment. The 'home' boundary represents the approximate extent of the scope defined for the present document - including communication to associated services.




Figure A.2: Example of a reference architecture for consumer IoT deployment in a home environment

Figure A.3 shows an example, realistic, deployment of consumer IoT within a home. The following use-cases illustrate how this setup would be used and clarify what would and would not be covered under definitions:

- The Smart TV communicates with two external services. The first is the Device Telemetry Service (an associated service); this captures, with user permission, information from the TV such as crash logs and data on usage to enable the developers to fix software defects and prioritize development of new functionality. The Smart TV also connects to a Video Sharing Service through an application downloaded by the user after initialization. This Video Sharing Service enables a user to watch entertainment via a third-party application, which is installable within the operating system used by the TV. This streaming service would not be an associated service.
- The Gateway provides access to a variety of constrained devices, including an IEEE 802.15.4 [i.24] mesh network and a Light Sensor, used to monitor and manage the home. It connects to a Cloud Access Service that enables the user to control their Smart Lock remotely and see data from sensors. This is an associated service.

- The Smart Fridge has a web browser installed; this allows the user to view headlines from a news website while nearby. The news website would not be an associated service.
- The Weather Sensor is used by the user to check the temperature outside their home. As it is physically remote from the home itself it is unable to connect to the LAN. Instead it communicates via GSM directly to the WAN. The service the Weather Sensor connects to is an associated service.




Figure A.3: Example architecture of a consumer IoT deployment

A.2 Device states

Decommissioning devices is out of scope of the present document. A decommissioned device is in a state where sensitive data is not present. A device (from manufacturing to decommissioning) will transition between several states. These transitions are illustrated in Figure A.4, to make clear how the defined states could be used in a device. In this model, a decommissioned device would be in the Factory Default state, as the Factory Reset process is likely to be the process used to remove all user data and configuration.

EXAMPLE 1: When decommissioned, a device can be recycled, resold or destroyed.




Figure A.4: State diagram for consumer IoT device states

Within these states, Figure A.5 shows an example model for what data would be stored within an arbitrary device. It is not expected that this would be the same for every case.




Figure A.5: Model of example device storage in states

Annex B (informative): Implementation conformance statement pro forma

Notwithstanding the provisions of the copyright clause related to the text of the present document, ETSI grants that users of the present document can freely reproduce the pro forma in the present annex so that it can be used for its intended purposes and can further publish the completed annex including Table B.1.

Table B.1 can provide a mechanism for the user of the present document (who is expected to be an entity involved in the development or manufacturing of consumer IoT) to give information about the implementation of the provisions within the present document.

The reference column gives reference to the provisions in the present document.

The status column indicates the status of a provision. The following notations are used:

M	the provision is a mandatory requirement
R	the provision is a recommendation
M C	the provision is a mandatory requirement and conditional
R C	the provision is a recommendation and conditional

NOTE: Where the conditional notation is used, this is conditional on the text of the provision. The conditions are provided at the bottom of the table with references provided for the relevant provisions to help with clarity.

The support column can be filled in by the user of the present document. The following notations are used:

Y	supported by the implementation
N	not supported by the implementation
N/A	the provision is not applicable (allowed only if a provision is conditional as indicated in the status column and if it has been determined that the condition does not apply for the product in question)

The detail column can be filled in by the user of the present document:

- If a provision is supported by the implementation, the entry in the detail column is to contain information on the measures that have been implemented to achieve support.
- If a provision is not supported by the implementation, the entry in the detail column is to contain information on the reasons why implementation is not possible or not appropriate.
- If a provision is not applicable, the entry in the detail column is to contain the rationale for this determination.

Table B.1: Implementation of provisions for consumer IoT security

Clause number and title			
Reference	Status	Support	Detail
5.1 No universal default passwords			
Provision 5.1-1	M C (1)		
Provision 5.1-2	M C (2)		
Provision 5.1-3	M		
Provision 5.1-4	M C (8)		
Provision 5.1-5	M C (5)		
5.2 Implement a means to manage reports of vulnerabilities			
Provision 5.2-1	M		
Provision 5.2-2	R		
Provision 5.2-3	R		

Clause number and title			
Reference	Status	Support	Detail
5.3 Keep software updated			
Provision 5.3-1	R		
Provision 5.3-2	M C (5)		
Provision 5.3-3	M C (12)		
Provision 5.3-4	R C (12)		
Provision 5.3-5	R C (12)		
Provision 5.3-6	R C (9, 12)		
Provision 5.3-7	M C (12)		
Provision 5.3-8	M C (12)		
Provision 5.3-9	R C (12)		
Provision 5.3-10	M (11, 12)		
Provision 5.3-11	R C (12)		
Provision 5.3-12	R C (12)		
Provision 5.3-13	M		
Provision 5.3-14	R C (3, 4)		
Provision 5.3-15	R C (3, 4)		
Provision 5.3-16	M		
5.4 Securely store sensitive security parameters			
Provision 5.4-1	M		
Provision 5.4-2	M C (10)		
Provision 5.4-3	M		
Provision 5.4-4	M		
5.5 Communicate securely			
Provision 5.5-1	M		
Provision 5.5-2	R		
Provision 5.5-3	R		
Provision 5.5-4	R		
Provision 5.5-5	M		
Provision 5.5-6	R		
Provision 5.5-7	M		
Provision 5.5-8	M		
5.6 Minimize exposed attack surfaces			
Provision 5.6-1	M		
Provision 5.6-2	M		
Provision 5.6-3	R		
Provision 5.6-4	M C (13)		
Provision 5.6-5	R		
Provision 5.6-6	R		
Provision 5.6-7	R		
Provision 5.6-8	R		
Provision 5.6-9	R		
5.7 Ensure software integrity			
Provision 5.7-1	R		
Provision 5.7-2	R		
5.8 Ensure that personal data is secure			
Provision 5.8-1	R		
Provision 5.8-2	M		
Provision 5.8-3	M		
5.9 Make systems resilient to outages			
Provision 5.9-1	R		
Provision 5.9-2	R		
Provision 5.9-3	R		
5.10 Examine system telemetry data			
Provision 5.10-1	R C (6)		
5.11 Make it easy for users to delete user data			
Provision 5.11-1	M		
Provision 5.11-2	R		
Provision 5.11-3	R		
Provision 5.11-4	R		

Clause number and title			
Reference	Status	Support	Detail
5.12 Make installation and maintenance of devices easy			
Provision 5.12-1	R		
Provision 5.12-2	R		
Provision 5.12-3	R		
5.13 Validate input data			
Provision 5.13-1	M		
6 Data protection provisions for consumer IoT			
Provision 6.1	M		
Provision 6.2	M C (7)		
Provision 6.3	M		
Provision 6.4	R C (6)		
Provision 6.5	M C (6)		
Conditions			
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) passwords are used; 2) pre-installed passwords are used; 3) software components are not updateable; 4) the device is constrained; 5) the device is not constrained; 6) telemetry data being collected; 7) personal data is processed on the basis of consumers' consent; 8) the device allowing user authentication; 9) the device supports automatic updates and/or update notifications; 10) a hard-coded unique per device identity is used for security purposes; 11) updates are delivered over a network interface; 12) an update mechanism is implemented; 13) a debug interface is physically accessible. 			

History

Document history		
V1.1.1	February 2019	Publication as ETSI TS 103 645
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